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Abstract
In Turkey, as in many other countries, gender gap in par-
ticipation in education has remained persistent even though
female students have been outperforming male students in
terms of many measures of educational outcomes. The aim of
this thesis is to provide an overview of the trends in gender
gap in educational attainment in particular in higher educa-
tion in Turkey and to elaborate their potential causes and con-
sequences. The analysis of gender differences in educational
outcomes, enrollment decisions and preferences for higher
education programs, the centralized standardized test based
university entrance system is used as a tool to design the em-
pirical approach. First, I show that in Turkey, as in many
other countries, female students perform better in high school
and have higher test scores than males and are more likely
to enroll in higher education programs controlling for test
scores. Nevertheless, men still predominate at highly selec-
tive programs that lead to high-paying careers. The gender
gap at elite schools is particularly puzzling because college
admissions are based entirely on nationwide exam scores. Sec-
ondly, using detailed unique administrative data from the
centralized college entrance system, I also study the impact
of gender differences in preferences for programs and schools
on the allocation of students to colleges. Controlling for test
score and high school attended, I find that females are more
likely to apply to lower-ranking schools, whereas males set
a higher bar, revealing a higher option value for re-taking
the test and applying again next year. Finally, I also docu-
ment the gender differences in preferences for university pro-
gram attributes. I find that females and males value program
xx
attributes differently, with females placing more weight on
the distance from home to college, and males placing more
weight on program attributes that are likely to lead to better
job placements. Together, these differences in willingness to
be unassigned and in relative preferences for school attributes
can explain much of the gender gap at the most elite pro-
grams which has important implications for the persistency
of gender wage gap and occupational differences in Turkish
labor market in spite of the improvements in gender gap in
educational achievements.
xxi
Chapter 1
Gender Differences in
Education in Turkey
It is well acknowledged that education of women is crucial especially for
developing world as the social benefits of women’s schooling are signifi-
cant for several reasons such as fertility, infant mortality and child health
and education, social cohesion, and crime (De Walque 2007; Filmer 2006;
Herz and Sperling 2004; Schultz 1993, 2002; Sen 1999; Subbarao and
Raney 1995; Summers 1994; Thomas 1990; UNESCO 2000; Watson 2005).
Moreover, also private returns to education is higher for women than
men. Although results vary by country, women receive higher returns
to their schooling investment in terms of earnings: their return, on av-
erage, is 9.8%, compared with 8.7% for men (Psacharopoulos and Patri-
nos 2004). Therefore, participation of women in education in lower rates
causes also economic inefficiency.
Even though lower rates of participation of women in education is
unequal, inefficient, and detrimental for development, women partici-
pate in education less than men in many countries. According to Psacharopou-
los and Patrinos (2004), on average, women obtain less schooling than
men on average. Nevertheless, the gender gap in educational outcomes
1
has disappeared and even reversed in many developed countries. At the
moment, female educational attainment clearly dominates male educa-
tional attainment in a majority of industrialized countries and it holds for
several measures of educational outcomes. Women are in clear majority
among secondary school graduates, among students enrolled in tertiary
education, and among tertiary graduates. Moreover, females obtain bet-
ter scores at standardized tests and higher GPAs with resect to males.
On the other hand, a sizable gap remains in schooling levels in most
developing countries. Also in Turkey, gender gap in participation rates in
education is still significantly high. However, similar to developed coun-
tries, there has been a sharp increase in female educational outcomes
such as GPAs and standardized test scores with respect to males.
The aim of this dissertation is to provide an overview of the trends in
gender gap in educational attainment in particular in higher education
in Turkey and to elaborate their potential causes and consequences. In
order to conduct the analysis of gender differences in educational out-
comes, enrollment decisions and preferences for higher education pro-
grams, the centralized standardized test based university entrance sys-
tem is used as a tool to design the empirical approach.
The dataset employed in this study was obtained from a merge of the
2008 Student Selection Examination for university entrance (OSS in Turk-
ish) dataset and 2008 Survey of the OSS Applicants and Higher Educa-
tion Programs dataset. The OSS dataset provides administrative individ-
ual information on test scores, high school weighted GPA’s, the submit-
ted choice list of university programs and the placement outcome for the
1,646,376 applicants. On the other hand, the Survey of OSS applicants is
a survey conducted by OSYM where the applicants are asked questions
about the socioeconomic characteristics of their household, high school
achievements, private tutorials, applicant’s views about high school ed-
ucation and private tutorials. This is a survey conducted online and
62,775 applicants answered the survey questions in 2008. I have access to
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only a random sample of about 16% with 9983 observations. Finally, the
Higher Education Programs dataset provides the information about the
characteristics of the universities and higher education programs (such
as whether it is private or public, instruction language, cutoff grades
for previous years, capacities,...etc). I constructed a unique dataset by
merging the characteristics of university programs from Higher Educa-
tion Programs dataset by each university program that applicants list.
In the first chapter, I document the trends in educational outcomes
using both National Education Statistics and individual level economet-
ric analysis using the dataset of Student Selection and Placement System
(OSYS in Turkish) for the year 2008. I show that in Turkey, as in many
other countries, female students outperform males in high school. They
also have higher test scores than males and are more likely to enroll in
higher education programs controlling for test scores. Nevertheless, men
still predominate at highly selective programs that lead to high-paying
careers.
In the second chapter, I elaborate the gender gap at elite schools which
is particularly puzzling because college admissions are based entirely
on nationwide exam scores. Using detailed unique administrative data
from the centralized college entrance system, I study the impact of gen-
der differences in preferences for programs and schools on the alloca-
tion of students to colleges. Controlling for test score and high school
attended, I find that females are more likely to apply to lower-ranking
schools, whereas males set a higher bar, revealing a higher option value
for re-taking the test and applying again next year.
In the third chapter, I analyze the heterogeneity in preferences for
higher education program characteristics. Using the matched adminis-
trative dataset including the choice lists submitted by university appli-
cants, I find that females and males value program attributes differently,
with females placing more weight on the distance from home to college,
and males placing more weight on program attributes that are likely to
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lead to better job placements.
Together, these differences in willingness to be unassigned and in rel-
ative preferences for school attributes can explain much of the gender
gap at the most elite programs which has important implications for the
persistency of gender wage gap and occupational differences in Turkish
labor market.
1.1 Education System in Turkey
Formal education system in Turkey consists of primary education, high
school education and university. Primary education is only compulsory
part and gives education for 8 years. Until 1997, primary education was
only 5 years and middle schools that give 3 years education were not
compulsory. In 1997 compulsory education has been extended to 8 years
of basic education covering also the middle school education.
After compulsory education, the secondary level of schooling con-
sists of general high school with an additional 4 years of education or a
vocational high school. Before 2006, there were also vocational and gen-
eral type of high schools where the education duration was 3 years. In
2006, all high schools started to give 4 years of education. There are also
general and vocational high schools where the medium of instruction is
a foreign language. Entry to certain high schools is by a centralized ex-
amination.
General high schools offer a curriculum preparing students for uni-
versity education with a tracking system where students are expected to
be specialized in a major and choose a future education or labor market
career accordingly. Similarly, the vocational high schools offer technical
education preparing students for vocational higher education within the
higher education system. There are also privately operated tutoring cen-
ters which both give additional support during the formal education and
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also prepare students both high school entrance and university entrance
examination.
Turkish government provides formal education for all the citizens
free of charge at each level. Primary and High school education is un-
der Ministry of Education’s control. Together with public schools, there
are also private schools at each stage of the education system that is reg-
ulated again by Ministry of Education.
Access to university is provided with a centralized system since 1974.
Private universities have started to operate in late 1980s. In 2008 there
were around 160 universities in Turkey and around 35 of them were pri-
vate universities. In last couple of years number of private universities
have been sharply increasing and providing college placements for many
applicants. Both private and public universities provide 4-years univer-
sity programs as well as 2 years vocational programs. There is also the
so-called Open Education which is a distance learning system granting
four-year degree where students follow lectures broadcast on national
TV or online and sit for the centrally administered examinations.
Access to any kind of higher education program is provided only
through a test-based exam at a national level implemented by a cen-
tral authority (Student Selection and Placement Center-OSYM in Turk-
ish). After taking the test, applicants submit a list of higher education
programs in an order of their preferences and OSYM assigns students
to each program with limited capacities considering the preferences and
test scores. Given the number of applications, the demand for higher ed-
ucation is quite far from to be met.
In 2008, about 1.5 million applicants took the university entrance ex-
amination where about 20% were high school seniors who take the exam
for the first time and the rest of the applicants were retakers. Out of 1.5
million applicants t 12.5% were placed in a four-year university program,
9.0% were placed in a two-year program and 13.4% were placed in the
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Open Education programs.
Considering this huge excess demand, in order to avoid the over-
enrollment in higher education, the system designed in a restrictive way.
Therefore, the national university entrance examination has a discarding
structure with a doublefold objective: Firstly, it denies access to univer-
sity for the least successful students with the presumption that they may
drop out or generally perform poorly at university. Secondly it gives ac-
cess to university to the most successful students and accordingly with
their preferences offers them a place in a university and field of study
that is presumed to maximize their utility. Driven by excess demand and
high competition there is a large number of applicants every year retak-
ing the test as they previously failed to obtain a sufficient test score to be
placed in a desired program.
1.2 An Overview of Gender Gap in Educational
Attainments in Turkey
There are several areas of concern within the education system in Turkey.
The most important one is the low female enrollment rates especially in
rural areas. Although returns to schooling is higher for females in Turkey,
gender gap in participation rates in education is still significantly high.
In Turkey, in general, womens returns to education is not any lower
than those of mens. Using 1987 Household Budget Survey, Tansel (1994)
shows that womens returns to education is higher than those of men
at the primary and middle school levels. Similar results are reported
by Tansel (1996, 2004) using 1987 Household Labor Force Survey and
1994 Household Budget Survey. According to these results, for the wage
earners, womens returns to education are higher at the middle school,
high school and at the university level and also for the self-employed,
womens returns to education are much higher than that of mens. Bakis
et. al. (2010) analyze returns to education in Turkey using data from
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Table 1: Gender ratio by educational year and level of education
Education Year Primary Education Secondary Education Higher Education
1997/’98 85,63 74,70 69,58
1998/’99 86,97 75,50 69,44
1999/’00 88,54 74,74 70,96
2000/’01 89,64 74,41 73,56
2001/’02 90,71 75,87 75,17
2002/’03 91,10 72,32 74,33
2003/’04 91,86 78,01 74,09
2004/’05 92,33 78,72 74,66
2005/’06 93,33 78,76 77,20
2006/’07 94,11 79,65 77,65
2007/’08 96,39 85,81 78,74
2008/’09 97,91 88,99 80,08
2009/’10 98,91 88,59 83,38
2010/’11 100,42 88,14 -
Source: Ministry of Education. National Education Statistics 2001.
2006 Household Labor Survey and find that Turkish labor market is seg-
mented by gender and returns to education are uniformly higher for
women.
Table 1 shows the gender ratio of schooling at different levels of ed-
ucation for the period between 1997 and 2011. Although Female-Male
ratio is considerably lower than 1 except for primary education level in
2010-2011 academic year, it has been considerably improving over these
years: It has increased from 85.63 to 100.42 at primary education level,
from 74.70 to 88.14 at secondary education level and from 69.58 to 83.38
at higher education level.
In Turkey, also female labor force participation (especially urban level)
has been lower than any other country in the OECD or Europe. Fe-
male labor participation has been higher in rural areas of the country,
as girls usually stay home and join family labor while boys are more
likely to go to school in these areas. As for the wage inequality, it mainly
comes from low levels of female education and the inequality in educa-
tion starts at very early levels of education where girls fail to complete
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even 8 years of compulsory schooling. On the other hand, similarly with
many other countries in the world, girls have been showing higher per-
formance compared to boys in terms of general educational outcomes.
For instance, females have a higher high school GPA on average with re-
spect to boys, but are less likely to take the test for university entrance.
The gender gap in terms of university applications as not as severe as ear-
lier levels of education where 44% of high school graduates were girls
while 38% of applicants (including retakers) were girls. Once females
take the test, they are more successful than boys in all fields, but this
better performance is not visible in the labor market. One of the most
distinctive difference across gender at university applications appears to
exist in retaking decision. Among the 2008 university entrance test ap-
plicants, 55% of girls were retakers while 66% of boys retook the test.
Similarly for those who are placed in a program, 76% of girls and 84% of
boys have taken the test at least once before.
A sharp increase in female educational outcomes such as GPAs and
standardized test scores and a reduction in gender gap in higher educa-
tion have been observed in many countries in the past decades and this
trend has been analyzed with different approaches in order to under-
stand the sources and implications of this catch up. In Turkey, especially
at high school and university entrance level females have been outper-
forming males which can be easily seen in Table 2 where gender differ-
ences in achievements at the university entrance test in 2008 are reported.
From Table 2, it is clear that females have higher high school GPAs
and test scores on average. As it was previously stated, girls are less
likely to obtain a high school degree and take the university entrance
test and this might create a selection bias.
One of the possible drivers causing the gender differences in test
scores could be differences driven by the positive selection of females.
Indeed, it seems females have better financial support and their parents
are relatively better educated with respect to boys. Table 3 shows parents
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Achievements by Gender in 2008 Univer-
sity Entrance Test
Female Male Diff
High school GPA 76.53 72.03 4.50
(11.21) (11.58) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Equally Weighted-1 212.55 206.03 6.53
(35.90) (42.80) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Equally Weighted 2 153.68 145.22 8.46
(83.63) (86.58) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Quantitative 1 188.20 188.75 -0.55
(38.71) (45.26) (0.0008) ∗∗∗
Test Score Quantitative 2 111.46 106.15 5.31
(98.32) (100.30) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Qualitative 1 219.11 209.58 9.53
(34.24) (42.05) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Qualitative 2 111.57 96.25 15.32
(101.90) (101.46) (0.0000)∗∗∗
If assigned 0.63 0.62 0.01
(0.48) (0.49) (0.0000)∗∗∗
education and some family support indicators by gender and it shows
that the mean differences in parents education levels are positive and
significant. Female applicants do not only have better educated parents
but also they are significantly more likely to attend private tutoring cen-
ters. Also, it seems that their parents are more likely to be willing to
pay a private university tuition which is considerably higher than public
universities. These descriptive statistics could arguably support the idea
that girls are not discriminated in terms of family support as one might
expect.
1.3 Gender Differences in Achievements in Dif-
ferent Categories
As it is previously stated, there is a positive selection of females in the
university applicants population. In order to avoid the effect of this pos-
itive selection on the gender differences in test scores I first estimated
9
applicant’s test scores in each category on individual characteristics con-
trolling also for high school and high school type fixed effects. As there
is a similar competitive system for the allocation of students in the transi-
tion from primary to secondary education in Turkey, controlling for high
school and high school type provides a strong control for unobserved
ability.
Estimation results are reported at the Table 4 where high school type,
field and city fixed effects are included controlling for other individual
characteristics such as retaking, private tutoring, and working status.
At the same table, positive and significant coefficient of the dummy
variable taking value 1 of the applicant is a second taker, shows that there
is a positive relationship between retaking and test scores in many cat-
egories. Controlling for other individual characteristics, second-takers
have significantly higher test scores even though the level of this effect
varies across categories. (e.g. there is a significant negative relationship
between retaking and foreign language while the highest significant ef-
fect is seen on quantitative test scores.). As the university entrance test
is a standardized test, it is not surprising that an applicant is more likely
to obtain a higher test score with another year of preparation and thus
many applicants choose to re-take the test in order to increase their test
scores.
1.4 Gender Differences in Placements to Higher
Education Programs by Categories
In the previous section, it is reported that female applicants obtain higher
test scores on average with respect to males. In this section, it is aimed
to provide evidence for gender differences in probability of getting an
assignment. I estimated discrete placement outcome by categories with
multinomial logit on gender controlling for all of the test scores and high
school GPAs, and I found that there are significant differences between
10
Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Getting No Assignment by Gender
boys and girls in terms of placement outcome. Table 5 shows the mean
gender differences in predicted probabilities of placement in all cate-
gories. First line indicates that boys are significantly more likely to get
no assignment with respect to girls.
The predicted probabilities of assignment outcome by categories for
females and males are shown also in graphs in order to see how the pre-
dicted probabilities of assignment outcome changes by test scores. As
one can easily observe from the Figure 1, the difference between boys
and girls in terms of predicted probability of getting no assignment is
more visible for low and high test score applicants.1
In the previous section, it is reported that female applicants are more
likely to get an assignment controlling for test scores and other individ-
ual characteristics. As a final step, it is aimed to provide evidence for
gender differences in probability of getting an assignment to a top major
1One might be concerned about the high share of male applicants in the sample when
it comes to placement outcomes as it is a procedure of placement of applicants to a limited
number of programs that have pre-announced capacities. On the other hand, this bias goes
to a direction supporting the result.
11
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Getting An Assignment in Equally
Weighted 1 Category by Gender
that has higher expected returns is reported in Table 6. I first estimated
the probability of getting an assignment to one of the high return majors
controlling for test scores, individual characteristics, parents education
levels, high school types and high school specialization fields for the full
sample of applicants. I find around 8% higher probability of getting as-
signed to a top major with respect females. In order to control for dif-
ferences in test scores distributions between females and males, I also
introduced the squares and cubes of test scores into the analysis and it
reduced the difference to 7%. These results are shown in the first two
columns of the Table 6.
Given that females are more likely to get an assignment, I applied
the same estimations reducing the sample to the applicants who get an
assignment. Doing so, it is possible to measure the gender differences
in probability of getting an assignment to a top major given that they
are assigned to a program. The estimation without controlling for test
score squares and cubes gives a gender difference of 12% while when
these controls added the difference is reduced to 11%. These results are
reported in the 3rd and 4th columns of the Table 6.
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Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Getting An Assignment in Equally
Weighted 2 Category by Gender
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the gender differences in educational outcomes at dif-
ferent stages of education system in Turkey. With an emphasis on the
gender differences in University Entrance Examination in Turkey, I show
that female students outperform male students. They have higher test
scores than males and are more likely to enroll in higher education pro-
grams controlling for test scores. Nevertheless, males still predominate
at top majors university programs that lead to high-paying careers.
In the new era of technological developments, educational invest-
ments are becoming more and more important for labor market out-
comes. In particular, the recent trend of employment polarization will
likely lead to more pronounced differences between the labor market
fortunes of high- and low-skilled workers. Gender differences in edu-
cational attainment imply that these highly rewarded high-skill workers
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Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Getting An Assignment in Quantitative
1 Category by Gender
will be predominantly male and increasingly disadvantaged low-skill
workers will be predominantly female. Gender gap in educational at-
tainment can therefore have far reaching labor market implications.
The findings that are reported in this chapter imply a persistence in
the gender gap of the skill supply in Turkish labor market. Therefore,
the gender gap is likely to be persistent both in terms of wages and occu-
pational choice even though females obtain better educational outcomes
with respect to males. Given the higher returns to education for women
and the importance of the education and labor market participation of
women for economic development of a country, the potential reasons
and consequences of the gender differences in university applications
are a very relevant question to be studied in order to provide a policy
framework for both education system and labor market.
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Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities of Getting An Assignment in Quantitative
2 Category by Gender
Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Getting An Assignment in Qualitative 1
Category by Gender
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Parents Education and Family Support by
Gender in 2008 University Entrance Test
Female Male Diff
Parents Education and Support
if working 0.19 0.34 -0.15
(0.40) (0.47) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Private Tutoring 0.73 0.66 0.07
(0.45) (0.47) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Ratio of Number of Choices in Private Universities 0.33 0.32 0.01
(0.41) (0.41) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Ratio of Number of Choices in Other Cities 2.43 2.41 0.02
(4.19) (4.41) (0.0715)∗
Ratio of Number of Choices in Big Cities 0.54 0.48 0.06
(0.36) (0.36) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Mother education not reported 0.004 0.008 0.004
(0.07) (0.09) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Mother No Schoolling 0.11 0.23 -0.12
(0.32) (0.42) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Mother Primary School 0.47 0.43 0.04
(0.50) (0.50) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Mother Middle School 0.12 0.11 0.01
(0.32) (0.31) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Mother High School 0.20 0.15 0.05
(0.40) (0.36) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Mother College or beyond 0.10 0.07 0.03
(0.30) (0.25) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Father education not reported 0.02 0.03 -0.01
(0.14) (0.16) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Father No School 0.03 0.07 -0.04
(0.18) (0.26) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Father Primary School 0.29 0.32 -0.04
(0.45) (0.47) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Father Middle School 0.16 0.14 0.02
(0.37) (0.35) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Father High School 0.28 0.25 0.03
(0.45) (0.43) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Father College or beyond 0.22 0.19 0.03
(0.42) (0.40) (0.0000)∗∗∗
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Table 4: Test Score Estimations with High School Type, Field and City Fixed
Effects
EW1 EW2 QT1 QT2 QL1 QL2
Male -1.7665 -3.4857 2.4427 -1.4566 -3.4238 -5.4855
(.7494)∗∗ (1.4129)∗∗ (.7020)∗∗∗ (1.4909) (.7810)∗∗∗ (1.4514)∗∗∗
Second Takers 6.2576 9.1660 5.3675 4.9286 6.4145 8.3987
(1.0233)∗∗∗ (1.9294)∗∗∗ (.9586)∗∗∗ (2.0359)∗∗ (1.0665)∗∗∗ (1.9819)∗∗∗
Private Tutoring 8.6684 5.6147 8.1351 8.9813 7.4719 2.5257
(.8143)∗∗∗ (1.5354)∗∗∗ (.7628)∗∗∗ (1.6201)∗∗∗ (.8487)∗∗∗ (1.5772)
if working -12.4801 -8.5422 -11.5245 -10.9928 -11.8655 -2.0844
(.8104)∗∗∗ (1.5279)∗∗∗ (.7591)∗∗∗ (1.6122)∗∗∗ (.8446)∗∗∗ (1.5695)
Parents Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS Background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9983 9983 9983 9983 9983 9983
F statistic 34.0915 57.8012 60.5828 83.2523 22.849 98.0605
Table 5: Gender Differences in Predicted Probabilities from Multinomial
Logit Estimation of Placement by Categories: Females w.r.t. Males
Mean difference wrt males P-value
Probability of No Placement -0.0125 0.0000
Probability of Placement in FL Category 0.0121 0.0000
Probability of Placement in EW1 Category 0.0204 0.0000
Probability of Placement in EW2 Category 0.0232 0.0000
Probability of Placement in QT1 Category -0.0575 0.0000
Probability of Placement in QT2 Category -0.0107 0.0000
Probability of Placement in QL1 Category 0.0231 0.0000
Probability of Placement in QL2 Category 0.0018 0.0000
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Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities of Getting An Assignment in Qualitative 2
Category by Gender
Figure 8: Predicted Probabilities of Getting An Assignment in Foreign Lan-
guages Category by Gender
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Table 6: Gender Differences in Probability of Assignment to a Top Major
All-1 All-2 Placed-1 Placed-2
Male .0785 .0661 .1236 .1052
(.0069)∗∗∗ (.0064)∗∗∗ (.0099)∗∗∗ (.0094)∗∗∗
Second Takers .0356 .0280 -.0147 -.0171
(.0098)∗∗∗ (.0089)∗∗∗ (.0138) (.0130)
Third Takers -.0445 .0172 -.0742 -.0213
(.0096)∗∗∗ (.0089)∗ (.0138)∗∗∗ (.0132)
Fourth Takers -.0611 -.0032 -.0999 -.0430
(.0125)∗∗∗ (.0115) (.0185)∗∗∗ (.0175)∗∗
Private Tutoring .0095 .0138 .0231 .0235
(.0074) (.0068)∗∗ (.0112)∗∗ (.0105)∗∗
All-HS-GPAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
All-Test-Scores Yes Yes Yes Yes
All-Test-Scores-Powers Yes Yes
Parents-Education-Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
High-School-Type Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS-Background Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9983 9983 6184 6184
F statistic 23.5551 36.0187 22.9477 29.2023
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Chapter 2
Gender Differences in
Retaking Decision and It’s
Effect on Placement
Outcomes
In the last few decades, the gender gap in education has changed remark-
ably in favor of females. Females have begun to outperform males in
general achievements. However, while the share of males in total higher
education enrollment has fallen considerably in many countries, females
still remain underrepresented in many high-wage occupations.
There are a number of studies that provide explanations for the re-
duction in gender gap in higher education enrollment (Blau 1998; Goldin
et. al. 2006; Jacob 2002; Peter and Horn 2005; Reynolds and Burge 2004)
and gender differences in major choices (Barres 2006; Friedman 1989; Po-
lachek 1978, 1981; Turner and Bowen 1999; Xie and Shauman 2003; Zafar
2009). This literature could suggest two plausible explanations for the
gender differences in highly selective higher education programs: Dif-
ferences in preferences for college majors and differences in abilities and
achievement distributions. However, there is no comprehensive analysis
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incorporating both explanations to elaborate the differences in higher ed-
ucation enrollment and major choice decisions in order to understand the
reasons behind the persistent underrepresentation of females in highly
selective university programs and the poor reaction of the gender gap in
labor markets given the remarkable turn in female educational achieve-
ments.
To address this issue, I use detailed administrative data from the
Turkish university entrance test in 2008. Data includes applicants’ choices
over all university programs, so that I can directly investigate the poten-
tial differences in choices made by males and females conditional on test
scores.
In Turkey, the transition to higher education from high school is highly
centralized and only possible through a standardized test conducted at a
national level. After taking the test and receiving their scores, applicants
submit a list of higher education programs in order of preferences and a
central authority applies an algorithm to assign students to each program
taking into consideration the student’s preferences and their test score.
Given the large number of university applicants, the demand for higher
education is quite far from being met. In order to avoid over-enrollment
in higher education, the system is designed in a restrictive way. Driven
by high competition for getting into a quality program, there are a large
number of applicants every year who retake the test because they have
failed to obtain a high enough test score to be placed in their desired pro-
gram. This is why, many applicants who are not satisfied with their test
score choose to be unassigned at the cost of not enrolling at all and retake
the test the following year.
Retaking the test is costly and risky since applicants have to spend
another year preparing for the exam in a very competitive environment,
and face also the uncertainty of their new test score. Since the effect of un-
certainty and competition could vary across gender1, it is reasonable to
1Recent studies provide evidence suggesting that there are significant gender differ-
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expect that the willingness to be unassigned, reflected initially in choice
of university programs, and eventually in labor market outcomes, could
differ by gender. Applicants less willing to be unassigned to a univer-
sity should, for example, have a lower reservation university program,
which means that they should apply to university programs with lower
cutoff scores.
In this chapter, the institutional setting is used as a tool to investigate
gender differences in decision making that goes behind the universities
listed on applications. I particularly focus on describing the gender dif-
ferences in the reservation university program and on the potential effect
that school choice might have on placement outcomes, and thus the la-
bor market. For this, I construct a measure that allows me to describe
the willingness to be unassigned to a university, and show that there are
significant differences across gender in this measure. I also elaborate the
link between willingness to be unassigned and school choice. This ap-
proach is used on the search to answer the following crucial questions:
Are there gender differences in willingness to be unassigned and if so are
there any gender differences in university program choices driven by dif-
ferences in the willingness to be unassigned? I assemble a unique dataset
that allows me to address these questions. I use the 2008 Student Selec-
tion Test (Ogrenci Secme Sinavi-OSS in Turkish) Applicant Survey pro-
vided by Student Selection and Placement Center (Ogrenci Secme ve Yer-
lestirme Merkezi-OSYM in Turkish) together with administrative data
containing the choice lists submitted by each applicant and the informa-
tion on test scores in each field, high school information, and personal
achievements. I also consider the characteristics of different cities, uni-
versities, and programs from each student’s choices.
My results show that, controlling for test scores, high-school and other
ences in attitudes towards risk and competition and in performance in competitive envi-
ronments. Literature on gender differences in risk preferences and reaction to competition
shows that females are more risk-averse than males and they do not only avoid competi-
tion but also perform worse under competition (Dohmen and Falk 2006; Gneezy et al. 2003;
Niederle and Vesterlund 2005).
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individual characteristics, girls are less willing to be unassigned and they
are more likely to choose low profile schools as their lowest option and
to get assigned to lower cutoff score programs. Finally, according to re-
sults from rank ordered logit model estimations, girls are more likely
than boys to be concerned about admission probability rather than other
attributes, such as foreign language as the instruction language, which is
potentially a valuable asset for the labor market.
The focus of this chapter is on the effect of heterogeneity in the will-
ingness to be unassigned on the observed differentials in school choices,
university placements, and thus labor market outcomes among males
and females. Even though it is reasonable to remain agnostic on the rea-
sons behind the differences in willingness to be unassigned, it is also
possible to provide different possible explanations behind the obtained
results. This chapter documents for the first time the existence of a gen-
der gap in the willingness to be unassigned when it comes to choosing
universities and it’s effects on placement outcomes. Additionally, I offer
a new perspective on heterogeneity in school choice2 by measuring the
differences in reservation university programs.
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.1 , I provide de-
tails about the institutional setting in Turkey; in Section 2.2 , I describe
the data and show some descriptive statistics to motivate the rest of the
chapter. In Section 2.3 and 2.4, I explain the research design and report
the main results. In Section 2.5 , I conclude this chapter.
2.1 Procedure to Apply to Universities in Turkey
Ensuring equal opportunity in access to education is one of the major
challenges of the Turkish educational system, which is characterized by
crucial income, regional, and gender disparities. In the last 30 years,
the gender gap has been a persistent characteristic of Turkish university
2Cullen et al. 2003, Hastings et al. 2008, Kehinde 2011
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enrollment and of its labor markets. Female labor force participation (es-
pecially at the urban settings) has been lower than in any other OECD
country. In rural areas, for example, girls are more likely to stay home
and join family labor while boys are more likely to go to school. In the
past few years, however, this story seems to have been changing. As in
many other countries, girls in Turkey have begun performing better than
boys in terms of general education achievements. For instance, girls now
have higher high school GPAs on average. As for the university applica-
tions, the gender gap is not as severe; in 2008, 44% of high school gradu-
ates were girls while 38% of university applicants were girls. Also, girls
outperform boys on average on the university entrance test in almost ev-
ery field. Given these recent improvements in the relative performance
of girls, what remains puzzling is that there has been very little reduction
in the gender gap in terms of enrollment rates in highly selective college
programs that are linked to high-wage occupations.
In this section, I briefly explain the university entrance system in
Turkey. Some features of the application and admission procedure will
be important to understand how I answer the research question of the
chapter and will also shed some light on the decision-making of appli-
cants.
The national university entrance test is called as ”Student Selection
Exam” (OSS in Turkish) and the central authority, named Student Se-
lection and Placement Center (OSYM in Turkish) conducts the test and
placement process. The system has a discarding structure with a double-
fold objective: Firstly, it denies access to university enrollment to the
least successful students with the presumption that they may drop out
or generally perform poorly in college. Secondly it gives access to uni-
versity enrollment to the most successful students and according to their
preferences offers them a place in a university and field of study that is
presumed to maximize their utility. The only requirement for an OSS
application is to have graduated and/or be eligible to graduate from
high school. Applications are received by OSYM with a strict dead-
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Figure 9: University Entrance Test: Sections and Categories
line all around the country (around March). All high schools submit the
GPA’s of their students to OSYM which are used to calculate the final test
scores of applicants. The test is conducted at a national level on the same
date/time (in June) in all regions of the country.
High school students choose a broad field of study in their second
year such as: Sciences, Turkish-Mathematics, Social Sciences, Foreign
Languages, or Arts. The university entrance test has 2 main sections
as Quantitative and Qualitative in addition to a foreign language section
(See Figure 9).
Two mains sections each have 2 sub-sections. Regardless a student’s
choice of field in high school, each student answers essentially Quantitative-
1 and Qualitative-1 sections. Quantitative-2 and Qualitative-2 sections
are more advanced requiring more detailed knowledge in these fields.
Two mains sections each have 2 sub-sections in the following fields: So-
cial Sciences (history, geography and philosophy), Science (Biology, Chem-
istry and Physics), Mathematics, and Literature. The Foreign Language
25
section is an additional test. Regardless a student’s choice of field in high
school, each student answers essentially 4 sections which are Literature
1, Social Sciences 1, Mathematics 1, and Science 1. Section 2 with its
subsections such as Literature 2, Social Sciences 2, Mathematics 2, and
Science 2 and foreign language test are more advanced requiring more
detailed knowledge in these fields. Therefore students choose to answer
the questions of the subsections that pertain to their high school field.
Based on the number of correct and incorrect answers in these sec-
tions, 7 different test scores are calculated for each individual in the fol-
lowing categories: OSS Quantitative-1 score, OSS Qualitative-1 score,
OSS Equally Weighted-13 score, OSS Quantitative-2 score, OSS Qualitative-
2 score, OSS Equally Weighted-2 score4, and Foreign Language score. As
the coefficients that are multiplied with the number of correct answers
in each section are higher for the sections that pertain to applicant’s high
school field and they are also penalized for incorrect answers, applicants
tend to give priority to answer relevant sections of the test in order to
maximize their score.
For those with a test score higher than 160 in OSS Qualitative-1, OSS
Equally Weighted-1, OSS Foreign Language and a test score higher than
185 in OSS Quantitative-2, OSS Qualitative-2, OSS Equally Weighted-2,
OSS placement scores are calculated while those with test scores below
these thresholds are considered as ”failed”. Placement scores are cal-
culated in each category as a sum of OSS test score with the student’s
weighted high school GPA. Three different weighted GPA’s are calcu-
lated for quantitative, qualitative and equally weighted placement scores.
Weights control for OSS scores and the GPAs of all students of a given
high school as well as within high school fields. The weighted GPA is
calculated with lower coefficients in an off-field main category. For ex-
ample, an applicant having studied Sciences in high school field would
3It is calculated as a weighted average based on the correct and incorrect answers from
Quantitative-1 and Qualitative-1 sections
4It is calculated as a weighted average based on the correct and incorrect answers from
Quantitative-2 and Qualitative-2 sections
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have the highest coefficient for the OSS Quantitative categories (e.g. 0.8)
while it is the lowest for OSS Qualitative categories (0.2). Since weighted
high school GPA leads to a lower placement score for off-field categories,
it strongly discourages applicants to choose off-field university programs
as the field test score is required to apply.
Each university program is associated with one of the 7 subject cate-
gories and it has a pre-announced limited enrollment capacity which is
determined by Higher Education Council. Applicants receive their final
placement scores in all categories together with a booklet where they can
see the capacity and the cutoff score of each university program from last
year’s admissions.5 After knowing their final placement score in each
category and each program’s previous years’ cut-off scores of each pro-
gram, applicants make a list of programs up to 24 from 7 categories.
The allocation algorithm is based the on college optimal allocation
mechanism. All students who choose a university program are ranked
according to their placement scores in the the department’s associated
category with that department and the students with higher scores are
tentatively assigned to that program under the university program’s ca-
pacity constraint. (For example, the computer engineering department
is associated with the category Quantitative-2 and all applicants choos-
ing the engineering department of university A are ranked according to
their Quantitative-2 placement score.) Tentative assignments continue
at each step of the algorithm mechanism until each applicant gets either
one final assignment or no assignment. Since the demand for many pro-
grams is higher than the capacity of the programs, OSYM gives priority
to the applicants with higher test scores. Therefore an applicant will be
assigned to the program closest to the top of her preference list where her
test score is sufficiently high compared to the other applicants who have
the same department in their choice list given the capacity constraint.
5Each university program has a cutoff score which is determined by the placement score
of the last admitted student in last year
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On average around half of the applicants are placed in a university
program. The applicants who do not have sufficiently high test scores to
be assigned in any department on their list get no assignment and can re-
take the exam in the following years. A relevant feature of the system is
the punishment for re-taker applicants who are assigned to a university
program in the previous year. If an applicant does not enroll in her place-
ment and retakes the test in the following year, applicant’s weighted high
school GPA is calculated with a lowered coefficient. This rule highly dis-
courages applicants to have a program that they are not willing to attend
on their list. Therefore, applicants are encouraged to get no assignment
this year, remain unenrolled for a year and retake the test next year in
which case their test score in the next year remains ”unaltered” instead
of attending an undesired program or rejecting the assignment and re-
taking the test with lower weighted high school GPA.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Dataset
The dataset employed in this study was obtained from a merge of the
2008 OSS (Student Selection Examination) dataset and 2008 Survey of
the OSS Applicants and Higher Education Programs dataset. The OSS
dataset provides administrative individual information on test scores,
high school weighted GPA’s, the submitted choice list of university pro-
grams and the placement outcome for the 1,646,376 applicants. On the
other hand, the Survey of OSS applicants is a survey conducted by OSYM
where the applicants are asked questions about the socioeconomic char-
acteristics of their household, high school achievements, private tutori-
als, applicant’s views about high school education and private tutori-
als. This is a survey conducted online and 62,775 applicants answered
the survey questions in 2008. I have access to only a random sample of
about 16% with 9983 observations. Finally, the Higher Education Pro-
grams dataset provides the information about the characteristics of the
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universities and higher education programs (such as whether it is pri-
vate or public, instruction language, cutoff grades for previous years,
capacities,...etc).
Table 7 provides the summary statistics for applicants by gender. From
this table, it is clear that girls have higher high school GPAs on average,
test scores and a lower rate for retaking the test than boys. As it was
previously stated, girls are less likely to obtain a high school degree and
take the university entrance test and this might create a selection bias. In
order to avoid the positive selection in the favor of female applicants, my
analysis will be based on an empirical approach that conditions on the
test scores. In other words, it aims to investigate the differences in uni-
versity applications controlling for the standardized test scores obtained
by individuals.
As it was previously mentioned, an applicant can put up to 24 choices
on their application. In the sample of 9983 applicants, 1306 applicants
did not submit a choice list at all. 1217 of these did not submit a list al-
though they had a higher test score than the minimum of 160 in at least
one of the basic categories (Equally Weighted-1, Qualitative-1, Quantitative-
1, Foreign Language). 3238 applicants (one third of sample) submitted a
full list of 24 departments where the average number of choices in the
list was 14.28.
Table 7 also gives the summary statistics of characteristics related to
the choices made across gender. 9% of females and 11% of males do not
submit a choice list so that they do not receive an assignment although
they passed the threshold test score. Also, females seem to list a higher
number programs from a higher number of subject categories which im-
plies a more diversified choice list.
One of the possible drivers causing the gender differences in choice and
willingness to be unassigned could be differences in family support by
gender in favor of boys. On the other hand, given the positive selection
of females, it is reasonable to argue that girls are not as discriminated as
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one would expect. Indeed, it seems females have better financial support
and their parents are relatively better educated with respect to boys. Ta-
ble 3 in the previous chapter shows parents education and some family
support indicators by gender and it shows that the mean differences in
parents education levels are positive and significant. Female applicants
do not only have better educated parents but also they are significantly
more likely to attend private tutoring centers. Also, it seems that their
parents are more likely to be willing to pay a private university tuition
which is considerably higher than public universities. These descriptive
statistics could arguably support the idea that girls are not as restricted
in terms of family support as one might expect.
2.2.2 Theory and Evidence on the Willingness to be Unas-
signed to Retake the Test
In order to motivate the analysis, I describe a very simple model in a
search model context for the decision to get no assignment instead of
choosing a university program that has a feasible cutoff score given the
obtained test score. Let wi ∈ [w, w¯] denote the test score that applicant i
obtains this year and the utility of attending a university program that is
attainable with wi is given by U(wi) with U
′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0. Applicants
are risk averse so that U(wi) is concave and has decreasing absolute risk
aversion.
An applicant with the test score wi either accepts to choose a program
that is feasible with wi or to retake the test in the following year. Appli-
cant i is assumed to obtain a test score w˜i in the next year which is a
random variable given by:
w˜i = wi + si (2.1)
where si is the shock to the test score that has following mean and vari-
ance:
E(si) = µsi (2.2)
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V ar(si) = σ
2
si (2.3)
Therefore, w˜i is a random variable with cumulative distribution function
F (w˜i) and conditional mean and variance given by:
E(w˜i|σi) = wi + µsi (2.4)
V ar(w˜i|σi) = σ
2
si (2.5)
Given individual characteristics Xi, an applicant i with the test score wi
comparesU(wi|Xi) the utility of attending a program that is feasible with
wi and the expected value of retaking the test in the next year. Let V
i (wi)
denote the value of retaking the test, given test score wi obtained today,
and let wRi be the reservation test score of student i, i.e. if wi < w
R
i the
student decides to retake the exam. Given these definitions, we have the
following equations that fully characterize the problem faced by student
i:
V i (wi) =
∫ w¯
wR
P (w˜i|wi, Xi)U
i(w˜i)dw˜i +
∫ wR
w
P (w˜i|wi, Xi)V
i (w˜i) dw˜i− c
(2.6)
V i
(
wRi
)
= U i(wRi ) (2.7)
where c is the fixed financial cost of preparing for the test.
Facing such a problem, for a given variance in test scores, applicants
are expected to be less willing to be unassigned if the mean test scores
obtained by re-takers is lower. Similarly, for a given mean, a higher vari-
ance in test scores of re-takers would lead applicants to be less willing to
be unassigned.
31
In the dataset, there is only information for test scores in 2008. To
figure out the potential changes in the mean and variances of test scores
by retaking, I estimate the test scores on individual characteristics con-
trolling for high school and high-school-field fixed effects and I calcu-
late the differences in the residuals for first-time takers and second-time
takers for both boys and girls. According to the calculations summa-
rized in Table 8, I find that there is a significant increase in mean residual
test scores for re-takers both for among boys and girls while there is no
significant difference in the increase by gender. As for the variance of
residuals, there is no significant change in the variance of residual test
scores between first taker females and re-taker females while re-taker
males seem to have significantly higher variance with respect to their
first-taker pairs.
Considering these results together, with the fact that males tend to
retake the test more than females, it is possible to argue that males tend
to retake the test more than females even though they potentially face a
test-score distribution with a higher variance by retaking with the same
increase in mean score with females.
Other interesting descriptive statistics are obtained from the survey
questions related to the applicants’ self-assessments. In the survey, the
applicants are asked the following questions:
• Would you define yourself as a hardworking student?
• Would you define yourself as feeling pressure during the exams?
• Would you define yourself as being extremely nervous during the
exams?
• Would you define yourself as underperforming on the exams be-
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cause of anxiety?
The differences by gender in the share of applicants answering these
questions as ”absolutely agree” are summarized in the end of Table 7.
Girls are considerably more likely to define themselves as ”a hardwork-
ing student” while they also seem to be more influenced by the exams
by feeling pressure and being nervous which also they believe, affects
their performances. Looking at these descriptive statistics, one might
expect that females could be less willing to be unassigned because they
might want to avoid another year of stressful preparation for the test in a
competitive environment. Also, defining themselves as ”a hardworking
student”, females might believe they have already put maximum effort
into preparing for the test and another year of preparation would not
change their results as much.
The attitude towards willingness to be unassigned is highly related
to the reaction to competition as it requires preparing for the test another
year in a very competitive environment. In addition to the cost of another
year of preparation, the decision to retake also represents an example for
a decision related to risk taking where an applicant expects to obtain a
higher test score with an uncertainty in the next year. As a result, any
difference in preferences for risk, competition, and waiting an additional
year would also lead to the differences in willingness to be unassigned.
According to the evidence that DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) report,
more impatient job seekers set lower reservation wages. Also, Paser-
man (2007) argues that for US job seekers there is a lot of heterogeneity
- the degree of discounting for low and medium wage workers is very
high, while high wage workers are relatively more patient. Similar to job
searching, it is expected here that the more the applicant avoids being
unassigned, the lower the reservation university program of the appli-
cant since safer choices will necessarily have lower rankings.
Given these descriptive statistics, it is reasonable to expect to find
gender differences in reservation university programs that might explain
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the remaining gender differences in highly selective university programs
in spite of the reversal of the gap in scholastic achievements.
2.3 Willingness to be Unassigned
The question that I seek to answer in this section is: Whether boys are
more willing to be unassigned instead of being placed in a program that
has a cutoff score which is attainable with the test score obtained that
year. In order to answer this question, one should elicit the list of univer-
sity programs applicants submitted.
Since applicants do not know the exact cutoff scores for university
programs for the year that they take the exam, they infer a probability of
being assigned to a university program looking at previous cutoff scores
and their own test score. Thus, each student makes a choice list con-
sidering the assignment probabilities with the constraint that the list can
include up to 24 choices from 10,617 programs belonging to one of the 7
categories provided by 147 universities. The choice list typically includes
university programs having cutoff scores around their placement scores
in corresponding categories according to applicants’ expectations about
the cutoff scores that are mostly determined by the popularity of the pro-
grams and universities.
The most crucial part of the analysis in this section is the definition of
an individual’s willingness to be unassigned. To proceed more formally,
I describe how the applicants make their choice list in a simple frame-
work:
There are 7 categories broadly defined in accordance with the sec-
tions of the test such as quantitative, qualitative, foreign languages etc.
and every major is associated with one of these categories. Individual i
receives a set of test scores Si that contains a test score sit calculated for
each category t where t = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. From the 7 categories, indi-
34
vidual i choose program(s) j with expected cutoff score Cjt.
Given the properties of algorithm mechanism that assigns applicants,
it is possible to identify the last program for which an applicant is to be
assigned. As it is mentioned in the previous section, the algorithm mech-
anism is based on the college optimal algorithm with multiple categories.
All applicants choosing a program j from category t, regardless of the or-
der of the programs in their list for a given category, are ranked according
to their test score sit. Thus, for this category, an applicant would be as-
signed to the program j with highest cutoff score in her list that her test
score sit attains. Similarly, if the test score s
i
t does not attain any of the
programs chosen from a given category t, then applicant would get no
assignment from this category.
Let program lit with the lowest cutoff score chosen by individual i
from category t. lit is expected to be the last program in category t for in-
dividual i to be assigned. In other words, algorithm mechanism would
yield no assignment if the program with the lowest expected cutoff score
in a given category in the choice list would be above the test score.
As it was previously mentioned, the punishment rule for re-takers
who were assigned to a university program in the previous year discour-
age applicants to choose a program that they are not willing to attend.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the applicant is willing to get
no assignment from a given category, if not assigned to the last program
with the lowest expected cutoff score in that category.
I define an applicant i as willing to be unassigned if the lowest cutoff
score programs in all categories chosen to be higher than applicant’s test
scores in corresponding categories which implies:
Cilt > s
i
t (2.8)
for all t = 1, 2, ...7.
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The empirical model presented in this section is a reduced form mo-
del where I estimate the gender gap in the probability of being willing to
be unassigned based on the definition above. Thus, I estimate the proba-
bility that the expression given by (8) is fulfilled on the dataset described
in the previous section which allows to control for both high school and
high school field fixed effects.
The variable of interest M is an indicator variable taking the value of
1 for male applicants, and 0 else. The indicator variable for willingness
to be unassigned of applicant i at school h with the field f is denoted by
Rihf , then the model is given by:
Rihf = δMi + x
′
iβ + µh + µf + ǫihf (2.9)
where i = 1, ...N , h = 1, ...H , f = 1, ..., F , and ǫihf is a random error
term and the empirical hypotheses to be tested is δ > 0.
Further, I test whether the estimates of δ change by different specifi-
cations of the model where I introduce the controls that are supposed to
proxy the gender specific impacts on the probability of willingness to be
unassigned.
Based on the model above, the probability of willingness to be unas-
signed is estimated conditional on test scores and individual character-
istics controlling for fixed effects related to high school. Table 9 gives the
results from simple OLS, probit and OLS with high school fixed effects
and high school field fixed effects6 where standard errors are clustered
by high school city. According to these results reported in first three col-
6In a given high school, student might choose different fields in the end of first year and
the students are assigned to the classrooms based on the field choice. Therefore controlling
for retaking status, high schools and high school fields brings the analysis almost to the
level of comparing the students in the same classroom. Given the fact that the procedure
for placement in high schools in Turkey is based on a very similar centralized test based
system, controlling for high school related fixed effects allows me to control for unobserved
individual characteristics.
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umn of Table 9 that are robust to different specifications, the probability
of being willing to be unassigned is higher for boys. As the distribu-
tion of test scores can be different for females and males, the squares and
cubes of all test scores are also included in the OLS estimation with high
school and high school field fixed effect and results from this estimation
is reported in the last column. The gender difference is around 3% and
it’s a significant number given that the total share of applicants willing
to be unassigned is about 30%.
Another feature of the institutional setting is that there is a strong
tracking system discouraging applicants to choose majors that do not
pertain their high school field. This feature is even stronger with an affir-
mative action for technical high school students where applicants’ place-
ment scores are calculated adding some extra points in case they choose
the vocational university programs in their own field. Since the appli-
cants from technical high schools know that they will receive some extra
points in case they choose vocational programs, they might be choosing
programs that have relatively higher cutoff scores which does not nec-
essarily mean that they are willing to be unassigned. Moreover, the fact
that technical high school are mostly male dominated high schools might
confound our results for gender differences in willingness to be unas-
signed. In order to avoid this confounding effect, the same estimation
with high school and high school field fixed effects are run with dummy
variables for the technical high schools and an interaction term with gen-
der.
Another confounding effect might be driven by the fact that girls are
potentially more restricted to stay in their hometown and attend a local
college instead of attending a university in a big city where the best uni-
versities are cumulated7) To control for this effect, a dummy variable if
7Attending a college in a city different from hometown is more costly for students than
attending a college in hometown and families can have less control on their kids if they
leave the hometown. Therefore parents usually prefer that their kids stay in their home-
town to attend a local college for not only financial reasons but also to keep their kids close
to them.
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the high school city is one of the 3 big cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir)
and an interaction term with gender are included in the analysis. Table
10 reports the results for the estimations where the coefficient of dummy
variables for technical high schools and big cities and interaction terms
are insignificant with an ignorable change in the gender coefficient.
A way of comparing boys and girls in terms of the level of willingness
to be unassigned is to estimate the number of safe choices on gender con-
ditional on test score and individual characteristics controlling for high
school and high school field fixed effects. I define the number of safe
choices as the number of university programs that are listed by appli-
cant and that have lower cutoff scores than applicant’s test score. It is
assumed that the more is the number of safe choices listed by applicant
are, the less the applicant is willing to be unassigned. The first column
of the Table 11 shows that female applicants list a higher number of safe
choices than male applicants.
Another measure of how much an applicant is willing to be unas-
signed is the negative differences between lowest cutoff scores programs’
cutoffs scores and applicants’ test scores for all categories. This is to mea-
sure how much higher the cutoff scores of the lowest cutoff score pro-
grams in all categories listed by the applicant are than her test scores in
corresponding categories. As the sum of negative differences increase,
the probability of no assignment increases. The second column of the Ta-
ble 11 reports the results for the estimation of sum of negative differences
between lowest cutoff score programs’ cutoffs scores and applicants’ test
scores for all categories on gender conditional on individual character-
istics and high school and high school field fixed effects. Consistently
with the previous findings, this difference is higher for male applicants
by 6.80 on average.
Summarizing the evidence that is obtained in this section, it is suggest
that female applicants avoid being unassigned and they make a ”safer”
choice list to guarantee an assignment. Although it is difficult to disen-
38
tangle the reasons underlying the aversion from willingness to be unas-
signed, these results are strong enough to argue that this aversion might
imply a lower reservation university programs for females with respect
to males. Although several arguments can be suggested as a source the
differences in willingness to be unassigned such as girls avoiding risk
and competition, or some cultural norms that might affect their choices8,
it is very crucial to interpret the implications of this evidence of gen-
der differences in willingness to be unassigned on gender differences in
school choice therefore gender differences in outcomes in higher educa-
tion enrollment, major choice and eventually labor market outcomes.
2.4 Gender Differences in Reservation Univer-
sity Programs
2.4.1 Differences in Choices within Same Majors
As it was previously noted above, the fact that females are less willing to
be unassigned eventually implies that they also tend to target lower cut-
off score university programs. This difference might be well driven by
the differences in preferences for different majors as female applicants
might differ in preferences with respect to males. In order to eliminate
the gender differences that results from the differences in preferences for
majors, the gender analysis of the cutoff scores of chosen programs is
made by controlling for majors. The results of the estimations of the cut-
off score of the last choice and the cutoff score of the university program
where the applicant get assigned on gender conditional on test scores to-
gether with individual characteristics, high school and high school field
fixed effects, and majors are reported in the first columns of the Table 12
and Table 13 respectively. The results show that female applicants target
lower cutoff score programs within the same major as their last choices
with respect to male applicants. They are also placed in lower cutoff
8e.g. Females have lower reservation university programs because males are more likely
to be the breadwinner of the family
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score programs within the same major. The gender difference is around
3 points for last choice program on average while it is around 2 points
for assignment program.
Dogan and Yuret (2011) descriptively shows that girls are less mobile
than boys when choosing the location of college and it might potentially
restrict the availability of the alternatives for female applicants. There-
fore it might affect their choices as they will not consider the universities
that are out of their home city and/or region as an alternative in the
choice set. In order to control for the potential constraint of distance to
good universities in big cities, I reduced the sample of applicants that
attended to a high school in one of the three big cities: Istanbul, Ankara
and Izmir and an interaction term with gender9.
Second columns of Table 12 and Table 13 report the results showing
that gender difference in cutoff scores of last choice and assigned univer-
sity programs are still significant for applicants attending high schools
in 3 big cities and moreover the gender difference is even higher in these
cities which is 3.28 and 3.50 respectively for programs chosen as last
choice and programs where they are placed. This evidence suggests that
the gender difference in cutoff scores of last and placement choices is
not driven by the potential differences in constraints of distance to better
schools in big cities.
2.4.2 Differences in Choosing Majors
Since applicants differ in willingness to be unassigned, the choice lists
reflects these differences holding test scores constant. The aim of this
section is to elaborate the potential effect of differences in willingness to
be unassigned on the major choice and the focus is on the last choice that
is assumed to be reservation university program.
9I also exclude the technical high school graduates from this analysis as they might
confound the results because of affirmative action as explained in the previous section
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It is well reported that there are significant gender differences in ma-
jor choices where girls are more likely to choose literature and human
sciences whereas boys tend to choose engineering and natural sciences.
In order to disentangle the differences driven by the differences in will-
ingness to be unassigned, the first choice will be used as a control. The
main challenge in a logistic setup is the huge choice set. Each student
makes a choice list under the constraint that the list can include up to 24
choices from 10,617 programs. In order to reasonably narrow down the
choice set to a feasible set in a logit setup, initially I created a choice set of
majors rather than university programs. The question that this setup can
answer is whether girls tend to choose relatively lower profile majors as
their last choice controlling for the first choice.
The choice set of 18 majors is defined as following: Agricultural Sci-
ences, Communication Sciences, Dentist and Pharmacy, Economics-Business,
Economics-Administration, Engineering, Architecture, Health School, Lit-
erature and Social Sciences, Law School, Medical School, Open Educa-
tion, Pre-College Programs, Religion, Natural Sciences, Tourism, Voca-
tional Schools, Education. Finally ”no placement” is also included as
an alternative. As major such as Dentist-Pharmacy, Economics-Business,
Engineering, Law School and Medical School potentially lead to high-
paying careers among the alternatives, these majors are defined as ”High
Profile Majors”. These majors can be also considered as majors that are
characterized by a higher probability of dropping out as it requires more
effort to graduate because of the difficulty level of classes.
As a first stage, it is aimed to investigate if there is a gender differ-
ence in the probability of choosing at least one high profile majors in
their last three choices. Since I aim to investigating the effect of differ-
ences in willingness to be unassigned on major choice, I constrained my
analysis for those who choose at least one high profile majors in their top
three choices in order to control for the other factors that might affect the
preferences for majors. The estimation results for probability of choos-
ing at least one high profile major in their last three choices for this sam-
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Figure 10: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Law School as the first choice
ple are reported in Table 14. All specifications such as simple OLS, high
school, high school type, and high school field fixed effects estimations
are reported in this table and the coefficient of gender is positive, signifi-
cant and robust to all specifications suggesting that male applicants who
choose high profile majors at least as one of their top three choices are
more likely to choose high profile majors also in their last three choices.
In other words, female applicants, even though they choose at least one
high profile majors in their top three choice, are less likely to choose high
profile majors as their last choices since they might find those majors less
secure than low profile majors to guarantee an assignment.
As a further step, multinomial logistic model is used for the first,
last, and placement choices controlling for gender, test scores and retak-
ing status where the choice set is the same as described above. I calcu-
lated predicted probabilities for each alternative and obtained following
graphs where it is possible to see differences in predicted probabilities
for male and female applicants. The Figure 10 to 17 presents the graphs
showing the predicted probabilities by gender of choosing Law School,
Medical School, Pre-College and Vocational College programs as the first
and last option.
As for the vocational school, girls are more likely than boys to choose
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Figure 11: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Law School as the last choice
Figure 12: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Medical School as the first
choice
as their last option, while they are equally likely to choose as the first
option. As for the pre-college, girls are less likely than boys to choose
as the first choice while they are equally likely to choose as their last op-
tion. Pre-college and vocational college programs can be assumed to be
the least advantageous majors in terms of labor market outcomes and
these findings state that girls are willing to choose these majors as their
last option more than boys. As for the law school, girls are equally likely
with boys to choose as first option, while they are less likely to choose as
the last option. As for the medical school, girls are less likely to choose as
the last option, while more likely to choose as the first option. Since the
high profile majors such as law school and medical school have higher
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Figure 13: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Medical School as the last
choice
Figure 14: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Pre-College as the first choice
cutoff scores, choosing these majors as last option would yield an as-
signment with a relatively lower probability with respect to low profile
majors. Combining these results with those reported in the previous sec-
tion, females tend to choose lower profile majors and lower ranked pro-
grams within the same major as their last choices controlling for the first
choices.
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Figure 15: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Pre-College as the last choice
Figure 16: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Vocational School as the first
choice
2.5 Remarks
Despite the reversing gender gap in educational outcomes where cur-
rently females perform better on average in many countries, highly se-
lective colleges consequently high-wage occupations and industries re-
mained dominated by males. In Turkey, similarly, although females out-
perform males in scholastic success at high school and on the university
entrance test on average, university placement outcomes do not seem
to reflect these improvements in gender gap. The gender gap is still
apparent and large when we look at the general statistics on the num-
ber of quality university degrees hold by men and women. In order to
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Figure 17: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Vocational School as the last
choice
understand the forces driving these gaps, one should analyze potential
gender differences that might affect school choice. The particular institu-
tional setting in Turkey allows me to abstract from the two-sided prob-
lem which usually complicates the question of preferences vs. discrimi-
nation since I perfectly observe individual’s choices and test scores and
the placement is based on a computer-calculated algorithm that allocates
applicants only according to their choices and test scores.
Using a unique administrative dataset from a centralized system that
allows to control for test scores and to determine the reservation uni-
versity program, I created a measure for willingness to be unassigned
and I find that females are less willing to be unassigned. I incorporate
the willingness to be unassigned to the analysis of choices so that I dis-
tinguish between preferences and to a certain extent willingness to wait
an additional year. By this approach, I find that females tend to target
lower cutoff score programs within the same major as their last choice
that guarantee an assignment with a higher probability when control-
ling for their first choices. With respect to males, females are also more
likely to choose lower profile majors as their last choice when controlling
for the first choice.
In this chapter, I document the existence of a gender gap in the will-
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ingness to be unassigned and wait an additional year for a better college
enrollment. I present also evidence on differences in reservation univer-
sity programs that are defined through the willingness to be unassigned.
Reported evidence on differences in reservation university programs do
not only provide an explanation for the persistent gender gap in highly
selective college enrollments and high-wage occupations and industries
but also it offers a new perspective on heterogeneity in school choice.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics by Gender
Female Male Diff
Achievements
High school GPA 76.53 72.03 4.50
(11.21) (11.58) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Equally Weighted-1 212.55 206.03 6.53
(35.90) (42.80) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Equally Weighted 2 153.68 145.22 8.46
(83.63) (86.58) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Quantitative 1 188.20 188.75 -0.55
(38.71) (45.26) (0.0008) ∗∗∗
Test Score Quantitative 2 111.46 106.15 5.31
(98.32) (100.30) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Qualitative 1 219.11 209.58 9.53
(34.24) (42.05) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Test Score Qualitative 2 111.57 96.25 15.32
(101.90) (101.46) (0.0000)∗∗∗
If assigned 0.63 0.62 0.01
(0.48) (0.49) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Retaking
Birth year 1988.23 1987.68 0.55
(2.55) (2.99) (0.0000)∗∗∗
If retake 0.78 0.84 -0.06
(0.41) (0.37) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Number of trials 3.02 3.44 -0.42
(2.33) (2.77) (0.0000)∗∗∗
If previously assigned 0.24 0.32 -0.08
(0.43) (0.47) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Choices
Satisfy threshold but no choice 0.09 0.11 -0.02
(0.29) (0.31) (0.0000)∗∗∗
If choices from only one category 0.44 0.47 -0.03
(0.50) (0.50) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Number of categories 1.58 1.41 0.16
(1.01) (1.00) (0.0000)∗∗∗
24 prefs submitted 0.30 0.34 -0.04
(0.46) (0.47) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Number of Choices 14.46 14.18 0.28
(8.90) (9.44) (0.0000)∗∗∗
Survey Answers about Themselves
If define as hardworking 0.43 0.34 0.09
(0.50) (0.47) (0.0000)∗∗∗
If define as under pressure at exams 0.42 0.39 0.03
(0.49) (0.49) (0.0000)∗∗∗
If define as nervous at exams 0.45 0.41 0.04
(0.50) (0.49) (0.0000)∗∗∗
If define as underperforming at exams 0.41 0.40 0.01
(0.49) (0.49) (0.0000)∗∗∗
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Table 8: Differences in Mean and Variance of Residual Test Scores by Gen-
der and Retaking
FT Girls RT Girls DIff FT Boys RT Boys Diff Diff-in-Diff
Mean
-0.723 1.871 2.594* -1.542 0.141 1.682* 0.912
(1.183) (1.028) (1.567) (1.019) (0.781) (1.284) (2.026)
Variance
S. D. 28.367 29.580 30.3803 34.813
p-value 0.117 0.000
Table 9: Taking Risk of Getting No Assignment
OLS Probit FEs1 FEs2
Male .0455 .0483 .0356 .0338
(.0103)∗∗∗ (.0109)∗∗∗ (.0152)∗∗ (.0153)∗∗
Years Since Graduation=1 -.1152 -.1150 -.1325 -.1220
(.0184)∗∗∗ (.0181)∗∗∗ (.0225)∗∗∗ (.0222)∗∗∗
Years Since Graduation=2 to 4 -.0375 -.0368 -.0688 -.1001
(.0199)∗ (.0202)∗ (.0220)∗∗∗ (.0219)∗∗∗
Years Since Graduation=5 or more .0276 .0315 -.0486 -.0773
(.0244) (.0252) (.0294)∗ (.0293)∗∗∗
Private Tutoring .0237 .0252 .0165 .0144
(.0101)∗∗ ( .0108)∗∗ (.0171) (.0169)
If working -.0261 -.0281 -.0247 -.0292
(.0123)∗∗ (.0131)∗∗ (.0166) (.0164)∗
All High School GPAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Test Scores Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Test Scores Powers No No No Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
High School FEs No No Yes Yes
High School Field FEs No No Yes Yes
Obs. 8496 8496 8496 8496
F statistic 67.1634 1.2569 1.3394
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Table 10: Taking Risk of Getting No Assignment: Different Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male .0356 .0448 .0355 .0347
(.0152)∗∗ (.0195)∗∗ (.0152)∗∗ (.0160)∗∗
If HS in one of 3 big cities -1.4140 -1.3897
(1.0664) (1.0669)
If HS in one of 3 big cities by gender -.0222
(.0294)
If Technical HS .2751 .2671
(.6549) (.6569)
If Technical HS by gender .0076
(.0478)
Years Since Graduation=1 -.1325 -.1329 -.1325 -.1325
(.0225)∗∗∗ (.0225)∗∗∗ (.0225)∗∗∗ (.0225)∗∗∗
Years Since Graduation=2 to 4 -.0688 -.0691 -.0687 -.0687
(.0220)∗∗∗ (.0220)∗∗∗ (.0220)∗∗∗ (.0220)∗∗∗
Years Since Graduation=5 or more -.0486 -.0492 -.0485 -.0484
(.0294)∗ (.0294)∗ (.0294)∗ (.0294)∗
Private Tutoring .0165 .0166 .0167 .0167
(.0171) (.0171) (.0171) (.0171)
If working -.0247 -.0247 -.0247 -.0246
(.0166) (.0166) (.0166) (.0166)
All High School GPAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Test Scores Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
High School FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
High School Field FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 8496 8496 8496 8496
F statistic 1.2569 1.2566 1.2564 1.2558
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Table 11: Taking Risk of Getting No Assignment: Other Measures
Number of Safe Choices Differences between TS and CS
Male -.5297 6.1764
(.1677)∗∗∗ (1.4407)∗∗∗
Years Since Graduation=1 .4009 -5.0414
(.2476) (2.1268)∗∗
Years Since Graduation=2 to 4 .1798 -9.7177
(.2420) (2.0793)∗∗∗
Years Since Graduation=5 or more -.8850 -18.4346
(.3236)∗∗∗ (2.7800)∗∗∗
Private Tutoring -.1973 1.1047
(.1885) (1.6192)
If working -.0142 -6.8747
(.1822) (1.5653)∗∗∗
All High School GPAs Yes Yes
All Test Scores Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes
High School FEs Yes Yes
HS Field FEs Yes Yes
Obs. 8496 8496
F statistic 1.2612 1.1806
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Table 12: Cutoff Score of Last Choice
Last Choice Only 3 Big Cities No Tech High School
Male 3.0946 5.2397 2.9530
(1.2042)∗∗ (1.9539)∗∗∗ (1.2005)∗∗
If Retaker -7.3685 -8.2222 -7.3583
(1.5639)∗∗∗ (2.4057)∗∗∗ (1.5589)∗∗∗
Private Tutoring 1.1371 1.0288 .8654
(1.3870) (2.2564) (1.3832)
If working -3.2911 -2.6655 -3.1202
(1.3847)∗∗ (2.3096) (1.3804)∗∗
All High School-GPAs Yes Yes Yes
All Test Scores Yes Yes Yes
Cutoff Score of First Choice .0592
(.0091)∗∗∗
Majors Yes Yes Yes
High School Fields Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 6380 2209 4980
F statistic 233.2906 95.9372 231.1719
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Table 13: Cutoff Score of Placement Outcome
Placement Outcome Only 3 Big Cities No Tech High School
Male 2.0033 3.5058 2.1921
(.9413)∗∗ (1.5515)∗∗ (.7407)∗∗∗
If Retaker 1.1727 -1.7143 -5.4800
(1.1510) (1.8468) (.9510)∗∗∗
Private Tutoring .9752 .4148 -1.5520
(1.0362) (1.7271) (.8806)∗
If working -2.0106 -1.0925 -4.4417
(1.0393)∗ (1.7785) (.8693)∗∗∗
All High School GPAs Yes Yes Yes
All Test Scores Yes Yes Yes
Cutoff Score of First Choice .0562
(.0061)∗∗∗
Majors Yes Yes Yes
High School Fields Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5959 2176 4530
F statistic 187.0551 90.2989 617.8444
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Table 14: Differences in Major Choice As First 3 and Last 3 Choices by Gen-
der
(1) (2) (3)
Male .1552 .1527 .1671
(.0292)∗∗∗ (.0190)∗∗∗ (.0170)∗∗∗
Private Tutoring .0393 .0079 .0081
(.0437) (.0275) (.0330)
Years Since Graduation=1 -.0409 -.0851 -.1203
(.0392) (.0246)∗∗∗ (.0238)∗∗∗
Years Since Graduation=2 to 4 -.0665 -.0908 -.1185
(.0418) (.0264)∗∗∗ (.0221)∗∗∗
Years Since Graduation=5 or more -.1239 -.1309 -.1156
(.0715)∗ (.0452)∗∗∗ (.0448)∗∗∗
If Working -.0005 -.0422 -.0456
(.0365) (.0244)∗ (.0192)∗∗
All Test Scores Yes Yes Yes
All High School GPAs Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
High School FEs Yes No No
High School Field FEs Yes Yes No
High School Type FEs No Yes No
e(N) 2994 2994 2994
e(F) 1.3895 11.3691 115.5524
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneity in
Preferences for Attributes
of University Programs
The literature on gender inequality provides different economic theo-
ries. One of them is the discrimination hypothesis where the prejudices
such as cultural norms bring about gender inequalities, suggesting a
need for policy intervention. Another hypothesis suggests that gender-
differentiated outcomes result from personal preferences rendering im-
plications for public policy less clear. According to an alternative theory
based on the constraints, it is also argued that income and credit con-
strained households invest in sons over daughters education in order to
maximize future earning potential in an environment where males have
higher incomes than females.
Therefore the economic questions one should ask are most of the time
based on gender behavioral differences: Many of the studies find signif-
icant differences in outcomes between men and women. Evidence sug-
gests that women and men may have different preferences with respect
to health, savings, education, timing of marriage, and the number of chil-
dren they would like to have. It is difficult to distinguish whether these
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differences stem from differences in underlying preferences or in con-
straints between the genders, particularly when preferences themselves
are potentially endogenous to constraints. Nevertheless, it is still pos-
sible to measure and report the differences in preferences that can lead
to gender differences in terms of important economic outcomes. In this
chapter, I provide an evidence on gender differences in preferences for
university program attributes which eventually determines their univer-
sity and major choice that has a substantial effect on their future career
on labor market.
The data employed in this chapter comes from the same dataset as in
the previous chapter that is obtained from a merge of the 2008 OSS (Stu-
dent Selection Examination) dataset, 2008 Survey of the OSS Applicants
and Higher Education Programs dataset and the Higher Education Pro-
grams dataset from 2007 and 2008. Higher Education Programs dataset
provides the information about the characteristics of the universities and
higher education programs (such as major, the city where university is
located and distance to high school city, whether private or public uni-
versity and tuition status, instruction language, cutoff scores, capaci-
ties,...etc). I merged the characteristics of university programs from Higher
Education Programs dataset by each university program chosen by the
applicants.
After sitting for the university entrance test, students with a test score
higher than a certain threshold are eligible to list university programs on
her choice form in order of preference and the algorithm mechanism as-
signs applicants to programs depending on their choices and test scores.
As it is explained previously, each university program is associated with
one of the subject categories and it has a pre-announced limited enroll-
ment capacity. Applicants receive their final placement scores in all cat-
egories together with a booklet where they can see the capacity and the
cutoff score of each university program from last year’s admissions. Af-
ter knowing their final placement score in each category and each pro-
gram’s previous years’ cut-off scores of each program, applicants make
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a list of programs up to 24 from 7 categories. In 2008, there were 10.670
university programs in total provided by 156 universities including both
public and private universities.
Given the advantage of the dataset containing all choices in their or-
der of preferences, in this chapter I analyze the preferences for university
programs using both the choice of university programs from a large set of
alternatives and the ranking of these choices. It is organized as follows:
in Section 3.1, I report the results for the gender differences in preferences
for university program attributes using a rank ordered logit model that
uses only the chosen university programs for each individual as an alter-
native set and define the choice with highest utility according the ranking
of alternatives. In section 3.2, I introduce the decision of willingness to be
unassigned to the choice model. I first provide a research design based
on a discrete choice model and then report the mixed logit estimation
results. Mixed logit estimation yields estimates of individual coefficients
of the random utility model and I report the gender differences by their
willingness to get no assignment in the coefficients of attributes of uni-
versity programs. In Section 3.3 , I conclude this chapter.
3.1 Ranking University Programs
In this section, I use a rank-ordered conditional logit model to estimate
how applicants value university program characteristics and how the
weights placed on these characteristics vary across gender. Rank-ordered
logistic model is also known as exploded logit model. Exploded refers to
a logit model that incorporates multiple-ranked choices for each person
but not only the first choice that gives the highest utility. (McFadden and
Train 2000, Train 2003)
The setting of rank-ordered conditional logit model is very similar
to a conditional logit model where a coefficient is obtained for each at-
tribute of the alternatives. In this rank-ordered model, each applicant
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is assumed to have an individual choice set and the individual choice
set is assumed to include only the university programs that are chosen
by the applicant and coefficients are mapped from the ranking of these
alternatives. Using this method, I obtain the coefficients for university
program attributes such as tuition status, distance from high school city,
instruction language, whether university is a public or private university,
whether university is in a big city etc.
The advantage of using this method is double-fold compared to a
conditional logit model: First of all, large choice set in our setting that
consists of more than 10 thousands university programs is not feasible
for a logistic regression. Second, since conditional logit model allows to
analyze only one choice from a choice set, one would loose an impor-
tant part of the information about preferences as most of the applicants
make more than one choice. On the other hand, rank-ordered logistic
regression use all the information about the programs that are chosen by
applicants mapping the coefficients from their ranking.
I estimated the rank-ordered conditional logit model separately for
the sample of girls and boys. Although the effect of gender is not identi-
fied, it is still possible to draw some general conclusions from the results
reported in Table 15 and Table 16. As the model is estimated separately
for females and males, comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients of
university program attributes for girls and boys does not provide any
significant information about how differently they value the attributes of
university programs. Yet, results can still provide evidence for gender
differences if one compares the signs and significance levels of the coef-
ficients. Coefficients of some attributes (such as whether the university
is in a big city, distance from home city to university city, capacity of the
program, whether it is a night school 1, scholarship status) are signifi-
cantly different from zero having the same sign for both female and male
1Night schools usually has the same instruction programs as normal programs but only
difference is the classes are scheduled in the evening and the tuition is relatively more
expensive than the normal programs.
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Table 15: Rank Ordered Logit Estimation: Attributes
Girls Boys ALL
Test Score-Cutoff Score -.0008 -4.00e-06 -.0002
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0001) (.0001)∗
If University is in Big City .3711 .4943 .4543
(.0185)∗∗∗ (.0130)∗∗∗ (.0106)∗∗∗
Distance from High School City -.00005 1.00e-05 -5.00e-06
(.00003)∗ (.00002) (1.00e-05)
Capacity .0012 .0006 .0008
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗ (.00009)∗∗∗
Foreign Instruction Language -.0658 .1692 .1031
(.0542) (.0336)∗∗∗ (.0285)∗∗∗
Night School -.1973 -.2353 -.2222
(.0193)∗∗∗ (.0133)∗∗∗ (.0110)∗∗∗
Private University with No Scholarship -25.0750 -25.7682 -25.2286
(.1774)∗∗∗ (.1367)∗∗∗ (.1083)∗∗∗
Private University with Scholarship -25.4407 -26.2224 -25.6551
(.2062)∗∗∗ (.1597)∗∗∗ (.1263)∗∗∗
samples.
On the other hand, some coefficients are different in terms of the sta-
tistical significance between girls and boys. First of all, as it is shown
in Table 15, the coefficient of the difference between cutoff score of pro-
gram and applicant’s test score which measures how likely that appli-
cant could be assigned to that program is significantly different from
zero for female applicants while male applicants are not as much con-
cerned about the likelihood of assignment when they make their choice
list. Likewise, distance from home to college is an attribute that females
value significantly while males seem not to place a significant weight on
it. Another difference in significance levels is observed on the coefficient
of foreign language attribute. While the coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant for male applicants, it seems that female applicants do not nec-
essarily prefer university programs where the instruction is in a foreign
language. 2.
2Usually English language
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Finally, as it is reported in Table 16, coefficients of indicator variables
for majors differ in terms of significance between females and males. As
it is described previously, there are 18 main majors where some of them
are defined as high profile since they lead to high-paying careers. In this
model, education major is taken as the base major since it can be related
to both in quantitative and qualitative categories therefore it is relatively
more comparable to all majors as an alternative. The coefficients for Agri-
cultural Sciences, Communication Sciences, Dentist and Pharmacy, Ar-
chitecture, Law School, Literature and Social Sciences, Open Education,
Natural Sciences, and Tourism majors are significant and has the same
sign for both boys and girls. The coefficients of following majors are
insignificant for girls and positive and significant for boys: Economics-
Business, Economics-Administration, Engineering, Health School, Med-
ical School, Pre-College Programs, Vocational Schools. Boys place more
weight on choice of majors that are higher profile than education such as
Economics, Engineering, Medical School3.
One might think that these differences in coefficients for the majors
might be driven by the differences in high school fields.4 Therefore one
can argue that differences in comparative advantages in different fields
across gender might yield differences in major choices. However rank-
order logistic setup takes the chosen alternatives as the choice set and
maps coefficients from the ranking. Therefore, this feature of the model
is essential to avoid potential confounding factors that might affect ma-
jor choice. Yet, even if these differences were assumed to be driven by
differences in high school fields, females still do not prefer high profile
majors in equally weighted categories (such as Economics, Business) to
education. The reason that females find education major more appealing
is that it is considered as the most convenient job for a female in the so-
3Males also tend to prefer pre-college programs or vocational schools rather than edu-
cation major. This result is expected given that males tend to apply low profile majors such
as two-years pre-college programs or open education programs to keep their student status
in order to be able to delay the compulsory military service
4Girls are more likely to choose qualitative or equally weighted fields while boys tend
to choose quantitative fields at high school
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ciety even though it usually leads to a very modest wage and career.
3.2 Preferences for the Attributes of University
Programs: Introducing Willingness to be Unas-
signed
3.2.1 Model
In this section, I provide a deeper analysis of the decision making for
the choice of university programs by introducing the willingness to be
unassigned. Considering the willingness to get no assignment of the ap-
plicant, the choice of a university program from an individualized alter-
native set can be modeled as following:
There are 7 categories broadly defined in accordance with the sec-
tions of the test such as quantitative, qualitative, foreign languages etc.
and every university major is associated with one of these categories.
Individual i receives a set of test scores Si that contains a test score sit
calculated for each category t where t = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. From the 7
categories, individual i choose program(s) j with cutoff score Cjt. Pro-
gram lit with the lowest cutoff score chosen by individual i from category
t is expected to be the last program for individual i to be assigned in cat-
egory t.
I define an applicant i as willing to be unassigned if the lowest cutoff
score programs in all categories chosen to be higher than applicant’s test
scores in corresponding categories which implies:
Cilt > s
i
t (3.1)
for all t = 1, 2, ...7.
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I describe the decision of willingness to take the risk of getting no as-
signment as following:
Applicant i obtaining a test score sit in category t has following op-
tions within each category:
- Choose at least one or more programs j from category t that are fea-
sible with sit which implies Cjt ≤ s
i
t,
- Choose one or more program j from category t only with Cjt > s
i
t
and be willing to get no assignment from this category,
- Choose no program and get no assignment from this category.
In the discrete choice setting of the reservation university program,
assume an individual i with test scores sit has the individual choice sets
from each category that are restricted to include only the lowest cutoff
score choice program chosen by the applicant and programs below. Ap-
plicant i assigns utility uijt to a feasible university program j from cate-
gory t with Cjt ≤ s
i
t and selects the highest expected utility. The event
that applicant i chooses j from category t is denoted by the indicator
dijt = 1 with
Jt
i∑
j=0
dijt = 1 (3.2)
where Cjt ≤ s
i
t for all j
i
t = {0, 1, ..., J
t
i } and t = {1, ..., 7}
For individual i, utility of the the lowest cutoff score program l cho-
sen by the applicant from this category t will have higher expected utility
than any other program j in this choice set. In other words, lowest cutoff
score program that is also defined as the reservation university program
will have a higher utility than any other university program that has a
lower cutoff score and not chosen by the applicant.
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U(Clt|Clt ≤ s
i
t, Xi) > U(Cjt|Cjt ≤ Clt, Xi) (3.3)
for all jit = {0, 1, ..., J
t
i } where t = {1, ..., 7}.
The utility that applicant i assigns to a feasible university program j
from category t is given by:
uijt = X
′
iβjt +Rjtαi + Zjtγi + ǫijt = vijt + ǫijt (3.4)
The termαi is the individual coefficient for the parameterRjtαi which
defines the university program j in category t as either risky or safe
choice. The parameter Rjt takes value 1 if the cutoff score Cjt is higher
than sit and 0 otherwise.
The term ǫijt is unobserved component of tastes and assumed to be
randomly distributed across the population.
Thus we can write for each category t:
P (dijt = 1|Cjt ≤ s
i
t, Xi, Zjt) = P (vijt + ǫijt > vikt + ǫikt) for all j 6= k
(3.5)
The probability of making a choice list Mi containing the best alterna-
tives from 7 categories will be given by the multiplication of probabilities
written for each category t:
P (Mi|Cjt ≤ s
i
t, Xi, Zjt) =
7∏
t=1
P (dijt = 1|Cjt ≤ s
i
t, Xi, Zjt) (3.6)
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3.2.2 Data Setting and Results
The data used in this section also comes from the same dataset that con-
tains the information for a random sample of 9983 individuals. For the
analysis of mixed logit, I use only 2% of this sample and I also drop
the applicants who fail to obtain a sufficiently high test score to make a
choice list and those who do not submit any choice list even though they
have sufficiently high test scores. Finally, I analyze the choices of 126 ap-
plicants.
For an individual i, I define an individual alternative set depending
on the lowest cutoff score choice that is reservation university program
for each category. I analyze the reservation university program choice
for a given category. I arrange the dataset by expanding for each indi-
vidual by the number of alternatives in each individual alternative set
for 11 categories. Finally, I drop the lines of categories from which the
applicant has no program listed.
Given the huge number of available alternatives, 10670 university
programs in 11 categories, I define individual choice sets that are compat-
ible with the decision of taking risk of getting no assignment. Even after
defining individual choice sets, it is still not feasible to run the mixed
logit model due to the large number of alternatives. Therefore, I take a
random sample of each alternative set for each category for an applicant
i.
The data setup for mixed logit estimation is also identical to that re-
quired by conditional logit estimation. In this analysis, an applicant i
faces n choices situations where n = {1, ..., 11}.5. e.g. If an applicant list
7 programs from 3 different categories, I define this applicant as facing
3 choice situation. Each observation in the data corresponds to an alter-
5In practice there are 7 categories in total but I divided the EA1, QL1, QT1, FL categories
in two parts as the cutoff scores and allocation algorithms can differ for certain programs
that are associated with these 4 categories. Therefore, in the data analysis, I use a setting
where there are 11 categories.
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native, and the dependent variable is 1 for the chosen alternative in each
choice situation (category) and 0 otherwise.
Given the research design explained above, using the mixed logit set-
ting I obtain the estimates of the individual parameters for the attribute
of university programs fitting a model in which all the coefficients for
university program attributes are normally distributed (Hole: 2007). I
estimated two different model where I consider different attributes and
major choices separately. The following explanatory variables represent-
ing some attributes of university programs enter the first model:
• Whether University Program is a Risky Choice (0-1 dummy)
• Whether University is in a Big City (0-1 dummy)
• Distance between University City and High School City
• Whether University is a Public University (0-1 dummy)
• Tuition Status (Scaled 1 to 8)
The coefficients’ summary statistics for the first model are reported
by gender in Table 17. The second model includes the majors as explana-
tory variables. In this analysis, I only take the high profile majors such as
Medical School-Dentistry-Pharmacy, Business-Economics, Engineering,
and Law School. Similarly, the coefficients’ summary statistics for the
second model are reported by gender in Table 18.
As it is reported in Table 17 there is no opposite preferences for any
attribute even though size of the coefficients seem to be different on aver-
age for male and female applicants. Male applicants dislike less the risky
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choices as their reservation choice of university program with respect to
female applicants. Another interesting finding is that the coefficients for
risky choices are not significantly changing by test score.
As for the choice of big cities for going to college, male applicants
prefers going to the universities in big cities more than female appli-
cants. Given that the most of the top ranked universities are located
in big cities in Turkey, differences in these coefficients would yield dif-
ferences in outcomes. Also Figure 19, shows the coefficients for females
and males applicants by their test scores. For almost every level of test
scores, male applicants have higher coefficients with respect to female
applicants. The coefficients of dummy variable for public universities
and the variable for tuition status are higher for female applicants. Simi-
larly Figure 21, 20 and Figure 22 shows these coefficients for females and
males by their test scores. Gender differences for tuition and distance co-
efficients are not significant although there is a significant difference for
the tuition coefficients for applicants with higher test scores.
Table 18, reports the results for the second model where I estimated
the coefficients for high profile majors such as Medical School, Economics-
Business, Engineering, and Law School. Female applicants dislike engi-
neering and economics and business majors while, male applicants like
to choose these majors. Even though there is no opposite preferences for
Law and Medical Schools, the size of the coefficients seem to be higher
for male applicants indicating that males like to choose these majors
more than female applicants. Similarly Figure 23, Figure 24, Figure 25
and Figure 26 shows the coefficients for females and males by test scores.
3.3 Remarks
In this chapter, I first provide evidence that females tend to be more con-
cerned about university program characteristics such as admission prob-
ability and distance from home to university city rather than other char-
acteristics such as foreign language as the instruction language which
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Figure 18: Coefficients by Gender and Test Score
could be an asset when they look for a job after graduation. Also, they
do not give a significant weight to the choice of major to be a high profile
major. The characteristics found to be valued by girls in their choices can
be classified as characteristics that matter during the university educa-
tion while other characteristics such as instruction language and major
are important after university as they will provide important advantages
in the labor market.
After showing the gender differences in preferences for university
program attributes using their choice list to map their preferences from
the ranking of the university programs, I also analyze the heterogene-
ity in preferences for university programs considering also the decision
for taking the risk of getting no assignment. In particular, I analyze the
decision making for taking the risk of being unassigned and it’s poten-
tial effect on the decision making for the university program choice and
preferences for these university program’s attributes. I find that female
applicants seem to weigh the characteristics that matter during univer-
sity even more when it comes to choose the reservation university pro-
gram and they sacrifice other qualities of the programs that might pro-
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Figure 19: Coefficients by Gender and Test Score
vide them a good profile later in labor market.
3.4 Conclusion
Despite the underlined importance of female participation in education
and labor market for the economic development, sizable gap remains in
schooling levels in most developing countries. Also in Turkey, gender
gap in participation rates in education is still significantly high. How-
ever, there has been a sharp increase in female educational outcomes
such as GPAs and standardized test scores with respect to males.
In this dissertation I aimed to give an overview of gender differences
in education in Turkey and it’s potential causes and consequences. First,
I reported the trends in educational outcomes showing that in Turkey, as
in many other countries, female students perform better in high school.
They also have higher test scores than males and are more likely to en-
roll in higher education programs controlling for test scores. Neverthe-
less, men still predominate at highly selective programs that lead to high-
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Figure 20: Coefficients by Gender and Test Score
paying careers.
Second, I elaborate the gender gap at elite schools which is particu-
larly puzzling because college admissions are based entirely on nation-
wide exam scores. Using detailed unique administrative data from the
centralized college entrance system, I study the impact of gender differ-
ences in preferences for programs and schools on the allocation of stu-
dents to colleges. Controlling for test score and high school attended,
I find that females are more likely to apply to lower-ranking schools,
whereas males set a higher bar, revealing a higher option value for re-
taking the test and applying again next year.
Finally, I analyze the heterogeneity in preferences for higher educa-
tion program characteristics. Using the matched administrative dataset
including the choice lists submitted by university applicants, I find that
females and males value program attributes differently, with females
placing more weight on the distance from home to college, and males
placing more weight on program attributes that are likely to lead to bet-
ter job placements.
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Figure 21: Coefficients by Gender and Test Score
Together, these differences in willingness to be unassigned and in rel-
ative preferences for school attributes that are reported and evaluated in
details in this dissertation can explain much of the gender gap at the most
elite programs which has important implications for the persistency of
gender wage gap and occupational differences in Turkish labor market.
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Figure 22: Coefficients by Gender and Test Score
Figure 23: Coefficients for Majors(Medical School) by Gender and Test Score
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Table 16: Rank Ordered Logit Estimation: Majors
Girls Boys ALL
Majors
Agriculture-Environment .0234 .0306 .0176
(.0683) (.0482) (.0393)
Communication -.4392 -.5321 -.5399
(.3603) (.2228)∗∗ (.1896)∗∗∗
Dentist-Pharmacy .8427 1.0203 .9514
(.0821)∗∗∗ (.0697)∗∗∗ (.0528)∗∗∗
Econ-Business .0088 .2224 .1227
(.0453) (.0400)∗∗∗ (.0299)∗∗∗
Econ-Administrative .0851 .1855 .1455
(.0924) (.0675)∗∗∗ (.0543)∗∗∗
Engineering .0700 .1762 .1283
(.0517) (.0360)∗∗∗ (.0293)∗∗∗
Architecture 1.1569 1.3095 1.2687
(.1858)∗∗∗ (.2183)∗∗∗ (.1410)∗∗∗
Health School -.1002 .1010 .0145
(.0574)∗ (.0504)∗∗ (.0376)
Law School -.2578 .0399 -.0759
(.0842)∗∗∗ (.0714) (.0542)
Literature .2926 .5220 .4059
(.0569)∗∗∗ (.0562)∗∗∗ (.0398)∗∗∗
Medical School .1151 .4441 .3248
(.0919) (.0642)∗∗∗ (.0526)∗∗∗
Open Education -.2612 .5301 .4661
(.3483) (.3698) (.2257)∗∗
Pre-College -.1115 -.2071 -.1935
(.2776) (.1239)∗ (.1126)∗
Natural Sciences .2593 .4388 .3610
(.0508)∗∗∗ (.0408)∗∗∗ (.0317)∗∗∗
Tourism .1857 .2003 .1705
(.1003)∗ (.0650)∗∗∗ (.0542)∗∗∗
Vocational -.0327 -.0522 -.0630
(.0527) (.0378) (.0305)∗∗
e(N) 30181 57276 87457
e(F)
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Table 17: Coefficients by Gender
Program is a Risky Choice -1.0109 -0.7946 -0.8650
StdDev 0.0032 0.0032 0.1018
University in a Big City 0.1732 0.4184 0.3386
StdDev 0.0035 0.0037 0.1154
Distance to Hometown -0.0025 -0.0019 -0.0021
StdDev 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035
Public University 2.3196 1.9846 2.0936
StdDev 0.0037 0.0042 0.1576
Tuition Status -0.2342 -0.2304 -0.2316
StdDev 0.0085 0.0083 0.0085
Table 18: Coefficients for Majors by Gender
Female Male All sample
Medicine-Dentistry-Pharmacy 1.0726 1.1683 1.1364
StdDev 0.0032 0.0031 0.0454
Econ-Business -0.0011 1.9900 1.3263
StdDev 0.0035 0.0037 0.9423
Engineering -0.0626 0.8097 0.5189
StdDev 0.0035 0.0035 0.4129
Law 1.2492 2.7527 2.2516
StdDev 0.0037 0.0042 0.7116
Figure 24: Coefficients for Majors(Econ-Business) by Gender and Test Score
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Figure 25: Coefficients for Majors(Engineering) by Gender and Test Score
Figure 26: Coefficients for Majors(Law School) by Gender and Test Score
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